[Perspective] What the US midterm elections could mean for the Taiwan Strait

The US midterm elections take place on Tuesday (3 November). The results will shape political relations between Congress and the White House, while also sending signals to both sides of the Taiwan Strait about US political realities. Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting will be held in Shenzhen, China, on 18 and 19 November. Whether the Chinese, US and Russian leaders will hold trilateral talks on the sidelines remains uncertain. With the midterms followed closely by APEC, Washington’s policy direction and its implications for the Taiwan Strait have become a focus of regional attention.

All 435 seats in the House of Representatives and about a third of the Senate’s 100 seats are up for election in these midterms. Congress influences the administration’s Taiwan policy primarily through budgets, legislation, hearings and oversight of the White House. It can allocate funds to support Taiwan’s defence, demand explanations of policy from the executive branch and increase political pressure through public statements. Arms sales notifications and diplomatic decisions, however, still involve the executive branch.

Thus, a concrete issue to watch now is an arms sales package for Taiwan worth about US$14 billion (S$17.9 billion), which is still awaiting approval from the Trump administration.

During his visit to China this year, US President Donald J. Trump described arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Beijing. The package remains unapproved. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post previously reported that Washington was also considering delaying the announcement of major arms sales to Taiwan until after the APEC summit in November and the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in December.

In May this year, eight senators from both parties jointly urged Trump to formally notify Congress of the proposed arms sales to Taiwan. Yet the package has still not been approved, showing that congressional statements may increase political pressure but cannot replace executive decisions.

The Taiwan Relations Act requires the US to provide Taiwan with the equipment it needs for its defence and to maintain the capacity to resist force or coercion. It is an important institutional foundation for security policy towards Taiwan, but it is not a mutual defence treaty and does not guarantee that US troops will intervene.

If the Democrats win control of one or both chambers, the first change is more likely to be in the intensity of oversight. Lawmakers may demand explanations from the administration about its engagement with China, progress on arms sales and security commitments. They may also use hearings to air policy differences. Whether Congress would be willing to confront Trump directly over these issues, however, remains to be seen.

If the Republicans retain both chambers, the Trump administration may face less congressional resistance, but that does not necessarily mean stronger support for Taiwan. Even bipartisan support for Taiwan within Congress does not mean that the executive branch will take the same position on every contentious issue.

Moreover, Congress does not determine US policy towards Taiwan on its own, nor would the election results automatically reverse its direction. A change in congressional control can reshape policy debate and the intensity of oversight, but cannot by itself determine how the White House manages relations with Beijing. The less predictable variable, therefore, is Trump’s personal approach to foreign affairs.

The APEC summit will offer another opportunity to assess this uncertainty. Russia has proposed arranging a trilateral meeting between China, the US and Russia in Shenzhen, and Trump has also expressed willingness to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. But the talks have yet to be confirmed, and no agenda has been announced.

If the trilateral talks go ahead, the summit could provide a setting for trade and economic negotiations, major-power diplomacy and discussions on the Russia-Ukraine war. There is currently no basis for judging whether the Taiwan Strait will feature in the dialogue. But if the leaders discuss Taiwan on the sidelines, or if observers link economic and trade outcomes to security issues, countries in the region will inevitably pay close attention to how the US draws boundaries between these matters. The summit’s primary focus is regional economic and trade cooperation. If security issues take centre stage, it will also underscore the reality that economic interdependence and strategic competition coexist.

The presence of the three leaders at the same event would not in itself amount to new policy arrangements. Observers would still need to distinguish the meeting’s symbolic significance from substantive commitments. A meeting between the leaders might improve communication, but it could also give Russia an opportunity to raise its international profile. Countries in the region will be particularly concerned about whether major-power talks can bring security issues within a sustained crisis-management framework, rather than treating them merely as short-term bargaining chips.

The spillover effects of tensions in the Taiwan Strait extend beyond military security. The US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has estimated that about US$2.45 trillion worth of goods passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022, accounting for more than a fifth of global maritime trade. A deterioration in the situation could put pressure on shipping, insurance, supply chains and regional investment.

The significance of the elections, arms sales decisions and summit talks therefore also lies in how they shape perceptions of the stability of US policy.

A change in congressional control, meanwhile, would not necessarily affect whether Beijing increases pressure on Taiwan. But if congressional oversight, White House decisions and signals from major-power summits contradict one another, the risk of miscalculation in the region could rise.

Hence, only clear, predictable policy signals and sustained crisis communication between major powers can help prevent parties from misreading election results or the atmosphere at a summit as a mandate to change the status quo.

Overall, the impact of the US midterms on the Taiwan Strait depends not only on which party controls Congress, but also on Trump’s personal decisions, progress on arms sales to Taiwan and interactions between China, the US and Russia during APEC.

With events still unfolding, it is too early to conclude whether risks in the Taiwan Strait will rise or fall. Together, however, these developments will test Washington’s ability to maintain consistent policy boundaries amid domestic political shifts and major-power bargaining. For countries in the region, the test is how to safeguard their own interests as major-power competition intensifies, prevent miscalculations from escalating into a security crisis and reduce the risk of disruption to economic and trade ties.