[Opinion] The measure of governance and ministerial accountability

On 29 October, Chen Guohuan published an article in Lianhe Zaobao (LHZB)’s opinion section titled “[Opinion] Ministerial pay through the lens of business and accountability”, discussing government performance and accountability. As my article sought to dispel the myth that high pay ensures integrity and did not address these two issues, I would like to offer a few thoughts.

In September this year, Parliament debated the 2026 report on the review of salaries for political appointment holders and Members of Parliament (MPs). MPs from both sides of the aisle, ministers and the Prime Minister had, in fact, already discussed government performance assessment and accountability mechanisms at considerable length. First, it must be recognised that governing a country and running a business differ fundamentally in their objectives, responsibilities and operating principles. Businesses primarily seek commercial returns and maximum profits. Governments, however, must address economic, social, education, defence, health, transport and other needs, with implications for the well-being of the entire population and the country’s long-term survival and development. The issues are complex and the responsibilities particularly weighty. Business performance standards and accountability principles therefore cannot simply be applied to government.

Nevertheless, democracy is, as the saying goes, government of the people, by the people, for the people. An elected government entrusted with governing a country must answer to voters, account for the results of its policies, and establish corresponding mechanisms for performance assessment and accountability. Singapore has long had such systems. What merits discussion is whether the existing mechanisms are sufficiently comprehensive, and whether there is room to refine the criteria for assessing individual ministers and the boundaries of their accountability.

For the Pioneer Generation, judging the government’s performance in the past was more a matter of personal judgement. We often measured the country’s development by comparing life in the early years of nationhood with life today: many people once lived in attap houses, whereas most families now live in HDB flats; poverty was once widespread, whereas overall living standards have since improved significantly. There has also been substantial progress in healthcare, education, transport, social services and economic development. These changes are not only part of people’s lived experience but are also supported by data. Public approval of the government’s performance over the decades is therefore not blind acceptance, but grounded in reality. Singapore’s government has also consistently ranked among the best in surveys by international research organisations, such as the Chandler Good Government Index.

Broadly speaking, a rising tide lifts all boats. Economic growth is the first priority in improving people’s lives, which makes gross domestic product (GDP) growth important. But by the standards of a modern society, government performance cannot be judged on GDP alone. Other indicators must also be considered, including the cost of living, income distribution, the wealth gap, housing affordability, healthcare coverage, social mobility, environmental protection and overall quality of life.

Indeed, the government has long had a multi-tiered framework for assessing public-sector performance. The Singapore Public Sector Outcomes Review, introduced in 2010 and published every two years, examines performance from a whole-of-government perspective in areas including the economy, social security, infrastructure, the environment, security, families and government effectiveness. In 2024, the government also established a whole-of-government performance reporting portal, presenting public agencies’ strategic priorities, development plans and key outcomes. The public can consult long-term plans for green development, land transport and disability services, as well as data on employment, income, housing, education, healthcare and infrastructure.

However, overall public-sector performance and the performance of individual ministers are two different levels of assessment. The former concerns the overall outcomes delivered by the government and public agencies; the latter concerns how ministers discharge their responsibilities for political leadership, policymaking and oversight of their ministries. The current ministerial salary system already takes performance into account. In 2012, the government accepted an independent committee’s recommendations and established the current salary framework for political appointment holders, dividing the benchmark annual salary into a fixed component of about 65% and a variable component of 35%.

The variable component comprises the Annual Variable Component (AVC), an individual performance bonus and a National Bonus. The Prime Minister determines each political appointment holder’s individual performance bonus, ranging from zero to six months’ salary, based on how they have discharged their duties. The National Bonus is calculated according to national socioeconomic outcomes. This effectively recognises that ministers differ in their abilities and performance.

The National Bonus currently has four indicators, each carrying a weight of 25%: the citizen unemployment rate, real income growth for median income earners, real income growth for the lowest 20% of income earners, and real GDP growth. From January 2027, the government will adjust the thresholds for meeting these targets. This includes tightening the unemployment rate and median income growth targets, and adjusting the GDP growth target in line with long-term economic growth potential. The real income growth target for lower-income earners will also be adjusted to between 3% and less than 4%.

This reflects the government’s desire to align the National Bonus more closely with people’s actual socioeconomic outcomes, rather than focusing solely on economic growth. This year, the government also accepted the review committee’s recommendation to study the inclusion of indicators reflecting Singaporeans’ “quality of life” in the National Bonus framework.

However, Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence Chan Chun Sing cautioned that quality of life involves many factors that are difficult to quantify, while some policy outcomes take years to emerge. Poorly designed key performance indicators (KPIs) could lead officials to behave in ways that meet targets but undermine the original intent of policies. Performance indicators must therefore take account of both objective data and people’s lived experience. Complex social outcomes must not be reduced to numbers simply to make assessment easier.

There were differing views in Parliament on whether individual ministers’ performance assessments should be more transparent. Some MPs proposed publishing the assessment criteria, or even each minister’s assessment results. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said the government would consider whether to disclose more information on political appointment holders’ actual salaries and bonuses. But he opposed publicly comparing and rating ministers’ performance individually, lest this become a “popularity contest” that affects policy judgement and the country’s long-term interests.

This concern is not without merit. Ministers have different responsibilities and types of work. Comparing them purely through figures or rankings may not only be unfair, but also encourage the pursuit of short-term, easily quantified results at the expense of policy goals that require sustained investment and whose outcomes are not readily apparent in the short term. What really matters is not who ranks higher, but whether there is a fair, reasonable and credible assessment mechanism to judge whether ministers are competent and properly fulfilling their responsibilities.

Beyond performance assessment, the more important issue is accountability: how ministers should be held responsible. Existing accountability mechanisms include parliamentary questions, debates and committee scrutiny; independent audits by the Auditor-General’s Office; the Prime Minister’s powers to appoint and remove ministers and assess their individual performance; and collective Cabinet responsibility. The issue, then, is not a complete absence of channels for accountability, but whether these mechanisms work effectively and how individual ministers’ responsibilities should reasonably be defined.

We may need to distinguish between responsibility for policy, administrative implementation and regulatory oversight. Ministers must answer for policy direction, the policymaking process and the soundness of policies. They have a duty to oversee implementation, but should not therefore be deemed personally at fault for every specific implementation error. As for regulatory systems, ministers must ensure that these function effectively and initiate reviews and corrective action when problems arise.

Take delays to the North-South Corridor project. Construction may encounter complex geological conditions, obstructions from underground infrastructure, technical difficulties or other unforeseen factors. We cannot conclude that the Minister for Transport has failed in their duties simply because the project is delayed. Similarly, MRT breakdowns, telecommunications service disruptions or technical problems in public healthcare clusters’ computer systems cannot all be blamed on the minister in charge. The first step should be to identify the root causes and establish the respective responsibilities of operators, contractors, regulators and other relevant parties. Accountability should serve to establish responsibility, correct shortcomings and improve systems, rather than turn every problem into grounds for holding a minister responsible.

Of course, this does not mean ministers can stand aside. If problems recur, if the government has long been aware of them but has failed to make improvements, or if a minister has not effectively discharged their coordination and oversight duties, political accountability must naturally follow. Even when ministers are not directly responsible for an incident, they must take political responsibility for how the government responds, corrects shortcomings and prevents similar incidents from recurring.

Ultimately, a reasonable approach to ministerial accountability must consider where responsibility lies, whether problems were foreseeable, what was within the minister’s knowledge and control, and how the minister actually discharged their duties. Only when the boundaries of responsibility are clear can accountability be fair, reasonable and effective. In a democracy, the ultimate form of political accountability is, of course, the general election and the choices voters make. As PM Wong noted during the parliamentary debate, voters must ultimately assess whether the government has made the right decisions, tackled difficult problems, improved people’s lives and moved the country forward. If it fails to do so, Singaporeans can choose another team to govern. This is the ultimate power to hold a government accountable that democracy gives the people.

Electoral accountability is periodic, however, and cannot replace day-to-day parliamentary scrutiny, administrative reviews and performance assessments. A mature system of governance needs both a capable government and effective oversight mechanisms. Democratic elections do not, in themselves, automatically guarantee an honest, competent and effective government. If elections fail to produce an honest and effective government, or even bring a corrupt government to power, the most comprehensive accountability mechanisms and performance assessment criteria may be rendered meaningless.

The real goal, therefore, is not merely to establish a set of KPIs or devise a seemingly stringent accountability system. It is to build a system of governance that selects capable and upright leaders, encourages responsible government, corrects mistakes promptly and ensures effective scrutiny of those in power. The government must be capable of governing the country well, while sound institutions must ensure that power is constrained and not abused. This is the true purpose of government performance assessment and political accountability, and an indispensable foundation for a mature, responsible system of democratic governance.

The writer is a former journalist and former People’s Action Party MP.